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Abstract 
This article tests Duverger’s law through an analysis of the Hungarian parliamentary 
elections of 2014 which were held under the new compensatory mixed electoral system. 
The results show that while a strategic voting had a tendency to grow under Hungarian 
supermixed system in the period 1990–2010, in the elections of 2014 strategic voting 
was not a universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many 
violations of Duverger’s law in Hungarian single-member districts. Our research 
confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent 
and at the district level inhibited by country-specific conditions. However, as a new 
Hungarian compensatory mixed electoral system distributes seats not only by plurality 
rule in SMDs (nominal tier), but also via proportional representation (list tier), a further 
research should pay attention to cross-contamination of both tiers of electoral system, as 
a potential factor which moves Hungarian electoral competition substantially away from 
Duvergerian predictions. 
 
Keywords: Hungary, parliamentary elections, party system, strategic voting, 
Duverger’s law. 
 
 
On 23 December 2011, Hungary adopted a new compensatory mixed 
electoral system (or mixed-member proportional, MMP), thus leaving (after 
almost twenty-two years and six elections, including the “founding” one) its 
current hybrid and world’s “most complicated” electoral system.1 A Hungarian 
electoral system was usually classified as “supermixed”, more specifically 
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“superposition-correction” system,2 mixed-member majoritarian system with 
partial compensation,3 or mixed-member proportional system,4 connecting two 
forms of mixed systems: a “superposition” type and a “corrective” or 
compensatory type, within three tiers: (1) single-member two-round (dual-
ballot) system; (2) proportional system with twenty regional districts; (3) 
national compensation list.5 
Furthermore, an important feature of the Hungarian “supermixed” 
system was that it favours, in a long-term perspective, larger parties at the 
expense of smaller parties,6 thus considerably influencing a shape of the party 
system. According to Benoit, the reasons for the concentration of the Hungarian 
party system were institutional, due to linkage between the single-member 
district (SMD) contest and proportional contest. Similarly, linkage between 
SMDs and compensatory national list resulted in the fact that a reductive effect 
of electoral system worked against smaller parties not only in SMDs, but also in 
a national list, which rewarded especially the largest parties, too.7 Similarly, 
Nikolenyi stressed the importance of electoral system as an institutional factor, 
which contributed to a reduction in the number of parties due to necessity of 
parties’ strategic coordination within various tiers of electoral system.8 
Thus, in contrast to many other Central and Eastern European countries 
which suffered from marked instability and fluidity of their party politics, the 
Hungarian party system was relatively stable and closed during the first two 
post-communist decades, with a failure of most new political parties, although 
with fluctuating support enjoyed by individual parties, especially in the 1990s.9 
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Since 1998 (or particularly 2002) thus the political competition in Hungary was 
dominated by interactions between two large political blocs of roughly an equal 
size (each of them composed of one large and one small party), with 
increasingly sharp delineation between them.10 
Similarly, comparing to other Visegrád countries, whose party 
competition was characterized by the prevalence (to varying degrees) of a 
socioeconomic dimension (especially in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, to a 
lesser extent in Poland) - which determined the most relevant lines of political 
conflict - the Hungarian party system was characterized by the prevalence of a 
strongly polarizing cultural dimension (or nationalist–cosmopolitan divide). A 
much less important and less polarizing economically defined left-right 
dimension cut across this dimension. The party choice between the left 
(dominated by the social democratic and liberal Hungarian Socialist Party 
(MSZP)) and the right (dominated by the national-conservative Alliance of 
Young Democrats (FIDESZ)), therefore, was based on the fact that while the 
Hungarian right is morally conservative (clerical), nationalist and anti-
communist, for the left the opposite is true, together with its libertarian-
cosmopolitan view on society.11 
However, while the MSZP has enjoyed stable support in some 
constituencies since 1990, the right-leaning electorate had been characteristic by 
much more fluidity and volatility until the elections of 2002 when the FIDESZ 
managed to integrate most voters of the “conservative bloc”, i.e. the former 
voters of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Independent Small-
holders’ Party (FKGP), and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).12 
In this context and despite a strengthening bipolarity of party competition 
between the FIDESZ and the MSZP, Enyedi warned that stability of the 
Hungarian party system is relative and fragile, as party competition was not 
based on “socio-structural underpinnings”, or the “organizational isolation of 
constituencies”.13 
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Furthermore, as pointed out by Meyer-Sahling and Jáger, while the party 
organizations in Hungary are weak, trust in political parties is low and the 
entrenchment of parties in society is informal at best; on the other hand, the party 
patronage has become a key feature of the Hungarian party politics and competition, 
as political parties traditionally have a much closer relationship to the state.14 
This possible concern materialized in the elections of 2010. The results 
for the governing MSZP were disastrous, as the party received only 59 out of 
386 seats (15.28%) in the Hungarian parliament, comparing to 190 seats 
(49.22%) in 2006, while the FIDESZ, a major opposition party, won 263 seats 
(68.13%), in coalition with the small KDNP.15 One of the election results then 
was adoption of the new Constitution, lowering the number of MPs from 386 to 
199, and adoption of new electoral legislation. 
The new Hungarian mixed-member proportional (MMP), or 
compensatory mixed electoral system distributes the 199 seats by two 
mechanisms: 106 seats by plurality vote in SMDs (nominal tier), and the 
remaining 93 seats via proportional representation (list tier) with 5% threshold. 
An important part of the electoral law is corrective mechanism, as the allocation 
of seats in the list tier depends on the outcome produced in the nominal tier. 
Thus, seats under the national list are distributed in proportion to the votes cast 
for party lists and “unused” and “surplus” votes cast in SMDs. While unused 
votes are the votes for the candidates who lost in SMDs, surplus votes are the 
votes cast for the winner from the SMD contest that have not been needed to 
obtain seats, i.e. the difference in the number of votes between the first- and 
second-place candidates in SMDs.16 
However, neither the outcomes of the 2014 elections, held under the 
new electoral system, brought a renewal of bipolar character of the Hungarian 
party politics. While the governing FIDESZ received 110 out of 199 seats 
(55.28%), or 130 seats (65.33%) together with its coalition partner (KDNP), 
respectively, the MSZP as one of the former two pillars of the Hungarian party 
system received only 29 seats (14.57%),17 i.e. only six seats more than the far-
right Movement for a Better Hungary (commonly known as Jobbik). The 
disruption of bipolarization of Hungarian politics was even more pronounced in 
SMDs, where the FIDESZ-KDNP coalition received 98.30% of the seats in the 
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elections of 2010, or 90.57% of the seats in the elections of 2014, compared to 
55.68% of the seats received in SMDs by the MSZP in 2006. 
The results of the last two parliamentary elections in Hungary thus 
suggest a possible long-term transformation of party competition together with 
the party system type. In connection with the aforesaid, this paper focuses on an 
analysis of the new electoral system used by Hungary in the elections of 2014 to 
examine the interactions between electoral system’s institutional attributes and 
the pattern of voter strategic behaviour, following Duverger’s assumptions, 
which William H. Riker called Duverger’s law and Duverger’s hypothesis.18 
Given that the main objective of our research is an analysis of the strategic 
voting at the SMDs level, we will work within the framework of the so-called 
“micro-Duvergerian” agenda (see below), which is based on the assumption of 
rational actors (and their rational calculations), standing behind the Duverger’s 
psychological effect (see below) at the district level.19 
Previously, Nikolenyi and Kiss analysed strategic voting in Hungary. 
Nikolenyi showed that while in the 1990s an electoral competition at the district 
level was characterized by prevalence of non-Duvergerian equilibrium, the 
election of 2002 was the first when the transformation of party system resulted 
in electoral outcomes in compliance with Duverger’s expectations.20 Similarly, 
Kiss, analysing the whole democratic period of Hungarian elections (1990–
2010) in SMDs, found “strong indirect evidence of strategic voting over 403 
races in six elections” together with the fact that “the strategic motivation of 
voters of third-place candidates was strongest in 2010 while no evidence was 
found for strategic voting in 1990”.21 In other words, while in the elections held 
early after a democratic transition voters of third-place candidates were 
“motivated by either the prospect of winning their districts, or by giving a signal 
that their parties have firm support” (i.e. not necessarily “by the prospect of 
deciding the race between the two leading candidates”), in the following 
elections, and especially in the elections of 2010, “strategic voting becomes 
more pronounced as the main fault lines of the political spectrum become more 
clearly defined”.22 This finding supports the Tavits and Annus’ “learning 
hypothesis”23 that strategic voting in third-wave democracies tends to increase 
as voters (but also political elites) become more experienced with the electoral 
                                                 
18
  William H. Riker, “The Two-party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History 
of Political Science”, American Political Science Review 76: 4, 1982, pp. 754. 
19
  Matthew Søberg Shugart, “Comparative Electoral Systems Research”, in Michael 
Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 30-32; Rein Taagepera, Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of 
Simple Electoral Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 101-114. 
20
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21
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process, and upholds the argument that the tendencies to classical Duvergerian 
competition are only effective over a series of elections. 
The Hungarian case thus allows us to test the hypotheses related to 
Duverger’s law in the context of a transforming party system. It may also help 
us verify Clark and Golder’s prior finding that Duverger’s theory receives much 
weaker support precisely in the countries that transitioned to democracy after 
1989.24 In this context, Charvát claims that the results of electoral reform in new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe contradict Duverger’s expectations, 
with more fragmented party systems in the countries using SMDs compared to 
the countries using proportional systems.25 Similarly, some studies analysing 
voters̕ strategic behaviour in post-communist countries (focused on strategic 
voting in the second-order elections) found significant inconsistencies to 
Duverger’s assumption, whether it was local elections in Romania held under 
the proportional system,26 or elections to the upper chambers of parliaments in 
the Czech Republic using the majority run-off two-round system (TRS) or 
Poland with the first-past-the-post (FPTP), respectively.27 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the existing 
formal literature on Duverger’s law. In the second part, the data and methods of 
analysis are introduced. In the third part, the analysis of strategic voting is 
presented. Finally, the concluding section formulates some implications of the 
results for further research. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: 
“Micro-Duvergerian” Agenda And Strategic Voting 
 
The importance of Duverger’s seminal work, Political Parties,28 lies in the fact 
that Duverger was one of the very first authors who highlighted the possibility 
                                                 
24
  William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the 
Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws” Comparative Political 
Studies 39: 6, 2006, pp. 697-703. 
25
  Jakub Charvát, “Úvahy nad otázkou platnosti Duvergerových hypotéz (Considerations on 
the validity of Duvergerʼs hypotheses)”, Slovak Journal of Political Science 9: 2, 2009, 
pp. 96-106. 
26
  Andrada-Maria Albescu, Dana Irina Ioniţă, Silviu-Dan Mateescu, “Strategic Voting at the 
Romanian 2008 Local Elections”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 3: 1, 2012, 
pp. 297-311. 
27
  Lukáš Hájek, “Strategické hlasování při volbách do Senátu Parlamentu České republiky 
(Strategic voting in elections to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic)” 
European Electoral Studies 10: 1, 2015, pp. 3-12; Pavel Maškarinec, “Strategic voting in 
the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duvergerʼs Law in the second-order 
elections”, Slovak Journal of Political Science 16: 4, 2016, pp. 369-388. 
28
  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, 
Methuen, London, 1954. 
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to predict relationships between electoral system and political outcomes.29 This 
research area was later called “Duvergerian agenda” by Shugart. The same 
scholar further emphasized its role as forming the core of the field of electoral 
studies research during the late 1900s.30 On the other hand, Benoit, and 
especially Riker, pointed to the fact that Duverger was not the first author to 
have discovered that simple plurality electoral systems have tendency to result 
in the two-party system.31 
Historically, both the Duverger’s law and the hypothesis have been in 
the centre of electoral research.32 However, until the 1990s, most empirical 
studies focused primarily on the national level (“macro-Duvergerian agenda”), 
although the district level (“micro-Duvergerian agenda”) is the most appropriate 
level for testing Duverger’s assumptions.33 But, especially since the 1990s, a 
number of studies have attempted to test Duverger’s law at the district level. 
Considerable attention has been given especially to the effects of electoral rules 
in SMD contests, as most authors dealing with the size of party systems see 
district magnitude (the number of seats that a particular district has in the 
parliament) as a major determinant of the number of political parties in a polity.34 
Duverger’s assumption that plurality rule can create a two-party 
competition is based on two underlying effects (“mechanical” and “psychological”) 
which create incentives for voters and candidates to act strategically.35 While 
the mechanical effect concerns how votes are translated into seats, the 
psychological effect consists of candidates’ and voters’ response to the 
workings of the mechanical effect.36 
The Duvergerian logic thus assumes that voters are short-term 
instrumentally rational, concerned only about affecting the outcome of the 
                                                 
29
  Rein Taagepera, Predicting Party Sizes… cit., pp. 101. 
30
  Matthew Søberg Shugart, “Comparative Electoral… cit.”, pp. 28. 
31
  Kenneth Benoit, “Duverger’s Law and the Study of Electoral Systems”, French Politics 4: 1, 
2006, pp. 70-71; William H. Riker, “The Two-party System… cit.”, pp. 754-760. 
32
  While Duverger’s law predicts that ‘the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the 
two-party system’, Duverger’s hypothesis claims that ‘both the simple-majority system 
with second ballot and proportional representation favour multi-partism’ (Maurice 
Duverger, Political Parties… cit., pp. 217, 239). 
33
  Matthew Søberg Shugart, “Comparative Electoral… cit.”, pp. 30-32; Rein Taagepera, 
Predicting Party Sizes… cit., pp. 101-114. 
34
  Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, CT, 1971; William H. Riker, “The Two-party System… cit.”; Arend 
Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Governments in Twenty-
one Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1984; Rein Taagepera and 
Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral 
Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1989. 
35
  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties… cit. 
36
  Kenneth Benoit, “Duverger’s Law… cit.”, pp. 74-76. 
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current election.37 Strategic voting is then indicated by the presence of voters 
who desert their preferred (small) parties (candidates), if they have only limited 
chances to gain a seat (as a reaction of political actors to the expected effects of 
the operation of electoral rules, i.e. the workings of a mechanical factor), in 
favour of less preferred parties (candidates) with real chances to succeed. 
Similarly, parties can act strategically by not nominating candidates (or by 
joining other parties or coalitions) in the districts where they traditionally have 
only limited support, with deterring potential for new entrants to join the race. It 
is then possible to describe Duverger’s law as an equilibrium that is reached 
only over a series of elections.38 In repeated elections, provided that all voters 
and parties act perfectly strategically, the equilibrium will emerge when only 
two candidates receive all the votes and the votes obtained by the third and 
following candidates approximate zero. 
At the empirical level of individual countries, most attention has been 
paid to the countries violating the assumption that plurality rule would lead to 
two-party competition even at the national level.39 Here, Diwakar analyzed 
Indian parliamentary elections in the period of 1952–2004 and argued that a 
large number of Indian districts do not conform to the Duvergerian assumption 
of two-party competition, with no consistent movement towards the 
Duvergerian equilibrium.40 Similarly, Gaines confirmed in the Canadian case 
the existence of multipartism even at the district level, with federalism as a key 
factor complicating the effects of plurality rule,41 as well as Chytilek, who 
characterized the Canadian electoral competition as extraordinarily complex, 
varying and mostly at odds with the Duvergerian logic.42 Finally, Dunleavy and 
Diwakar, analyzing SMDs outcomes in three leading plurality rule systems, 
argued that the USA seems to be a case of “stunted development”, the UK has 
moved substantially away from Duvergerian predictions, and India shows partial 
                                                 
37
  Matthew M. Singer, “Was Duverger Correct? SingleMember District Election Outcomes 
in Fifty-three Countries”, British Journal of Political Science 43: 1, 2013, pp. 203. 
38
  Brian J. Gaines, “Duverger’s Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism”, 
Comparative Political Studies 32: 7, 1999, pp. 837; Kenneth Benoit, “Duverger’s Law… cit.”, 
pp. 74-76. 
39
  Bernard Grofman, André Blais, and Shaun BOWLER (eds.), Duverger's Law of Plurality 
Voting: The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, Springer, New York, 2009. 
40
  Rekha Diwakar, “Duverger’s Law and the Size of the Indian Party System”, Party 
Politics 13: 5, 2007, pp. 539-557. 
41
  Brian J. Gaines, “Duverger’s Law… cit.”. 
42
  Roman Chytilek, “Between the Macro and Micro Duvergerian Agendas”, in Maxmilián 
Strmiska, Roman Chytilek, and Nikola Hynek (eds.), Federalism and Multi-level Polity: 
The Canadian Case, Anton Pasienka, Brno, 2007. 
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Duvergerian conformity, but combined with substantial vertical scattering of non-
Duvergerian results.43 
On the other hand, some studies, focused on the analysis of strategic 
voting in other countries, confirmed the assumptions related to the Duverger 
law. For instance, Reed argued that the 1993 Italian mixed-member majoritarian 
(MMM) system, based largely on SMD, confirmed the assumptions of 
Duverger’s law, as most of the electoral districts moved closer to bipolar 
competition.44 Similarly, Reed, analyzing election outcomes in Japanese 
elections in the period of 1947–1986 (Japan used plurality vote with multi-
member districts in this period), confirmed the validity of the law of simple 
plurality elections (i.e. Duverger’s law), although the process of reducing the 
number of candidates was very long (equilibrium was reached through trial and 
error processes only) and the “learning process” (rather than rationality) 
connects structure and behaviour.45 Finally, Maškarinec found a consistent, but 
not linear, movement towards the Duvergerian equilibrium in Mongolia (in the 
period of 1996–2004, when Mongolia used a two-round system, yet a non-
majoritarian one, i.e. the one which produced a similar pattern of strategic 
voting, as an ordinary plurality rule does). On the other hand, the emergence of 
bipolar party politics in Mongolia was not an immediate process and was 
reached only over a series of elections (supporting the so-called “learning 
hypothesis” also). More importantly, after the disruption of bipolar character of 
Mongolian electoral competition in the elections of 2012 (due to the 
introduction of MMM system), nor did the introduction of FPTP in 2016 result 
in electoral outcomes in full compliance with Duverger’s law and restoration of 
bipolar party politics.46 
Similarly, a recent analysis, working with large data sets of elections in 
SMDs, has confirmed that district magnitude had (at the district level) the effect 
that Duverger had expected, although the effect of electoral institutions could be 
contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-specific conditions (for 
instance, social cleavages that generate demand for additional parties).47 For 
                                                 
43
  Patrick Dunleavy and Rekha Diwakar, “Analysing multiparty competition in plurality rule 
elections”, Party Politics, 19: 6, 2011, pp. 855. 
44
  Steven R. Reed, “Duverger’s Law is Working in Italy”, Comparative Political Studies 34: 3, 
2001, pp. 312-326. 
45
  Steven R. Reed, “Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger’s Law to the Japanese 
Case”, British Journal of Political Science 20: 3, 1990, pp. 336. 
46
  Pavel Maškarinec, “Testing Duvergerʼs law: strategic voting in Mongolian elections, 
1996–2004”, Post-Soviet Affairs 33: 2, 2017, pp. 145-158; Pavel Maškarinec, “The 2016 
Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP 
and One-Party Dominance“, Journal of Asian and African Studies, online first, doi: 
10.1177/0021909617698841. 
47
  Matthew M. Singer, Laura B. Stephenson, “The political context and Duverger’s theory: 
Evidence at the district level”, Electoral Studies 28: 3, 2009, p. 481. 
18  PAVEL MAŠKARINEC 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 1  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
instance, Singer found that the average outcome under plurality rule is 
generally, although not perfectly, consistent with two-party competition. The 
two largest parties (candidates) typically dominate the districts, but third-place 
parties (candidates) do not entirely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party 
fragmentation even under plurality rule.48 Clark and Golder, who analysed the 
underlying causal process by which sociological and institutional factors shaped 
party systems, then concluded that Duverger was right about the determinants of 
party systems, as plurality rule systems acted as a “brake” on the process by 
which societal pressures translate into a growth or a decline in the number of 
political parties.49 Finally, Raymond, in his analysis of West European elections 
prior to the adoption of proportional representation, confirmed Clark and 
Golder’s finding about importance of “social cleavage explanation”.50 Thus, the 
occupational diversification, or the emergence of class cleavage, respectively, 
was positively associated with an increase in mean district-level party system 
fragmentation, eventually leading (in case of the presence of higher levels of 
social cleavage diversity) to violation of the two-party assumption associated 
with the anticipated effect of the Duverger’s law.51 Thus, although some studies 
have found rather mixed results, an important fact in this context is that even 
Duverger did not consider his proposition as valid, but rather as a possible 
tendency, which may be influenced by other factors.52 
However, with regard to mixed systems, Rich confirmed Reed’s finding 
that we can expect that electoral competition under the MMM will closely 
resemble the Duvergerian logic, as MMM systems tend to concentrate much 
more on district competition, whereas electoral contest under MMP systems will 
create a contaminating effect due to its greater emphasis on proportionality.53 
Similarly, Feşnic and Armeanu, analyzing a Romanian electoral reform of 2008 
(i.e. introduction of the MMP system), found rather mixed results, when the 
changes in party support were caused by dealignment rather than institutional 
factors (electoral system).54 For that reason, Herron and Nishikawa, Ferrara et 
                                                 
48
  Matthew M. Singer, “Was Duverger Correct… cit.”, p. 201. 
49
  William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory… cit.”, p. 706. 
50
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Politics 2: 1, 2015, pp. 2-5. 
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  Ibidem, pp. 2-5. 
52
  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties… cit., p. 228. 
53
  Timothy S. Rich, “Is Duverger’s Law Working in South Korea? An Analysis of District-
Level Elections 1988–2012”, Asian Journal of Political Science 22: 2, 2014, pp. 164-180. 
54
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Impact of the 2008 Electoral Reform in Romania”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political 
Science Review 14: 2, 2014, pp. 190-199; cf. Cristian Preda, “Partide, voturi şi mandate la 
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[1990-2012])”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 13: 1, 2013, pp. 27-58. 
Strategic Voting in the Hungarian Elections of 2014 19 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 1  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
al., or Rich pay attention to a contaminating effect of PR, as the list tier allows 
representation of smaller parties (apart from the two largest parties in SMDs), 
and supporters of these smaller parties are thus encouraged to support their third 
or worse-placed candidates also in SMD contests.55 Contrarily, Rich, in his 
analysis covering 90 mixed systems in 23 countries between 1990 and 2012, 
concluded that the distinction between MMM and MMP systems alone poorly 
explains the variation in district results and although MMM districts generally 
have fewer candidates, other factors also have direct influence on district 
competition (fused ballots, electoral threshold for PR, existence of compulsory 
voting), potentially distorting the Duvergerian logic and signalling a departure 
from Duverger’s law.56 
If we move back to theoretical considerations related to “micro-
Duvergerian” agenda and strategic voting, Cox tried to formalize the 
Duverger’s law and reformulated Duverger, generalizing the relation between 
district magnitude (M) and the number of “serious” contenders at the level of 
districts (of various sizes), while the number of “serious” contenders should be 
no more than M + 1. Cox called the “M + 1” rule a “direct generalization” of 
Duverger’s law, arguing that the number of viable contenders is equal to two 
when M = 1.57 However, as district magnitude increases, the number of 
contenders (candidates or lists) cannot be greater than M + 1. Thus, under the 
condition of perfect “strategic” co-ordination by both elites (candidates or 
parties) and voters, the number of parties or candidates (at district level) is two in 
plurality rule systems. 
Nevertheless, the existing two-party competition at the district level 
does not automatically lead to a two-party competition at the aggregate 
(national) level. On the contrary, a nationwide two-party competition is 
possible, as voters may think strategically not just about the district level but 
also about the national level, for instance with regard to the question of who 
will form the government.58 This may, in the next step, lead to other forms of 
equilibrium if a party with considerable support elsewhere in the country is 
willing to nominate candidates even in the districts without a real chance to win 
a seat, in order to strengthen its image before voters as a nationwide party; or 
there may be more instrumental motivations, such as public subsidies for 
                                                 
55
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political parties depending on the votes obtained or the number of seats 
contested. Similarly, if there exist incentives to form multipartism at other 
levels of government in the country (for instance, proportional representation at 
sub-national levels), voters may be willing to vote for nationwide parties with 
limited support at the district level, which they would strategically abandon.59 
However, the assumption about voter’s rationality was questioned by 
Reed who pointed to the uncertain psychological foundations of the assumption 
of short-term instrumental rationality, namely that voters will correctly analyse 
the situation and maximize their self-interest.60 In this context, the models 
grounded in Downsian approach,61 where political competition is based on a 
single dimension, are quite often in conformity with Duverger’s expectations.62 
According to Downs a rational voter decides with regard to “sophisticated” 
voting,63 which means that the voter does not vote for his preferred alternative, 
but for an alternative ensuring the best realizable outcomes, after considering 
anticipated votes by other voters.64 In Downsian perspective the process of 
voting (or candidate selection) takes place as part of the “selection process”, 
rather than an “expression of preference”.65 Nevertheless, Reed stressed that 
voter’s rational decisions are limited as party preferences are typically known at 
a national, rather than district level; learning, rather than rationality, then 
connects structure and behaviour.66 This finding is very important, as the effect 
of strategic voting is expected to work at the district level only. 
Cox formulates three conditions for strategic voting to potentially lead 
to bipartism: 1) short-term instrumentally rational voters; 2) reasonably accurate 
and publicly available information on candidate standings; 3) myopic (“price-
taking”) adjustment. Once again, an important aspect here is that without 
knowing different candidates’ preferences, voters are unable to make a plausible 
judgment as to which one of the top two “losers” in a race (second- or third-
place candidates in plurality vote) is the principal challenger, and thus who 
should obtain their strategic vote.67 As a result, supporters of the third-place 
candidate will face little incentive to cast their vote elsewhere, which leads to a 
non-Duvergerian equilibrium. Furthermore, Grofman, Blais and Bowler 
emphasized that the logic underlying Duverger’s law is in contrast to Grofman’s 
                                                 
59
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“embeddedness effects”,68 i.e. an assumption that electoral rule (institutional 
structure) is embedded in a wider political system that provides its own set of 
incentives.69 
Nevertheless, even Duverger’s original work was based on the 
assumption that the electoral system is not the only (exclusive) determinant of 
the number of parties. More importantly, Clark and Golder emphasized that in 
spite of being referred to as the father of the so-called institutionalist approach, 
Duverger clearly described the way in which social and institutional variables 
interact.70 However, many researchers often ignore his argument that the 
number of political parties is not determined primarily by electoral systems 
(institutional structure) but by social-economic factors (social structure). It is for 
that reason why Duverger describes the effect of electoral systems 
metaphorically as that of “a brake or an accelerator” which hinders or facilitates 
a growth in the number of political parties, but considers social-economic 
factors as the decisive “driving power” of a country’s party system.71 
Thus, although electoral rules (institutional structure) play an important 
role for Duverger, it is rather social heterogeneity (social structure) which is the 
primary driving force behind the multiplication of political parties. Electoral 
arrangements then only act as a modifier, translating the effect of social forces 
into the exact number of parties.72 
 
 
Data And Methods 
 
The basic data for this analysis consist of district-level results of the 2014 
elections in Hungary as collected by the National Election Office of Hungary. 
Because of the above-mentioned problems, we take different approaches to 
studying the extent of strategic voting at the level of Hungarian SMDs, as well 
as the psychological mechanism implied by Duverger, within the framework of 
the “micro-Duvergerian” agenda. 
First, we analyse the character of electoral competition (number of 
political parties) at the micro level. At the basic level of SMDs, we simply 
                                                 
68
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  Bernard Grofman, “Preface: Methodological Steps toward the Study of Embedded 
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calculate the percentage of the vote obtained by the top two (parties) candidates. 
However, as this may create a misleading picture of the size of the party system, 
we also use a measure which weighs parties according to their relative sizes. 
Specifically, we calculate the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) in 
each district as a measure of strategic voting and the effective number of 
parliamentary parties (ENPP) as a measure of parliamentary fragmentation.73 
According to Duvergerʼs theory, plurality rule should lead to a two-party 
competition, with effective number of parties of approximately two, while 
majoritarian rule should produce a larger effective number of parties. However, 
as the ENEP produces various values of fragmentation, Taagepera argues that the 
countries with the ENEP ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 are consistent with 
Duverger’s law.74 Similarly, Chhibber and Kollman use the value of 2.5 as the 
threshold, with districts where ENEP is greater than 2.5 violating Duvergerʼs law.75 
Second, we use the segmented Nagayama diagrams, which help us 
understand the nature of competitiveness at the district level.76 The main 
advantage of the Nagayama diagrams is that these diagrams can visually (i.e. 
more intuitively than other methods) display and compare the electoral 
outcomes for the degree of competition between the most successful parties, and 
the extent to which smaller parties get a substantial share of votes.77 In an effort 
to express in detail the characteristics of electoral competition, Grofman et al. 
divide the Nagayama diagram into eight segments that reflect the relative 
strengths of the first-, second- and other-ranking parties. While the percentage 
of results in segments A, B and C (see Figure 1) can be taken as indicating 
bipolarized results, the proportion of districts in segments F, G and H indicates 
multiparty results.78 
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Figure 1. Segmented Nagayama diagram79 
 
Finally, we use Cox’s Second-First Loser ratio, “SF-ratio” (the vote 
share secured by the second loser in relation to the votes secured by the first 
loser).80 The SF-ratio is useful as one of the possible ways of operationalizing 
Duverger’s theory and because it offers a detailed insight into the electoral 
behaviour at the lowest level of aggregation, including any instances of strategic 
voting (or the degree of tactical voting) across SMDs.81 Similarly, the SF-ratio 
offers the possibility to indicate various degrees of strategic defection from less 
competitive to more competitive districts across SMDs.82 An SF-ratio near 0 
signifies a Duvergerian equilibrium (the first loser is way ahead of the second 
loser), while the value of 1 shows a non-Duvergerian equilibrium where voters 
are unable to coordinate their electoral behaviour, leaving the two losers nearly 
tied. In other words, as it becomes clear who the top challenger in SMD will be, 
voters become much less likely to continue to support the candidates who are 
expected to run the third or worse. As a result, the second-ranking candidate 
will have many more votes than the third-ranking candidate in the district. In 
contrast, if voters are either unwilling or unable to cast strategic ballots, the SF-
ratios will tend to be higher. 
However, using the SF-ratio is not without potential problems. First, 
looking at SF-ratios one is not able to exactly differentiate between different 
SF-ratio distributions, especially the ones that are very similar. Second, SF-ratio 
values can be ambiguous for several reasons; for instance, when both the second 
and the third losers are considered potentially strong candidates and, therefore, 
                                                                                                                       
maximum for the second largest party under any pattern of competition (cf. Bernard 
Grofman, Alessandro Chiaramonte, Roberto D’alimonte and Scott L. Feld,, “Comparing 
and Contrasting… cit.”, pp. 275-279). 
79
  Ibidem, p. 276 
80
  Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count… cit. 
81
  Matthew M. Singer, “Was Duverger Correct… cit.”, pp. 209-210. 
82
  Robert G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner, “Strategic voting in established and new 
democracies: Ticket splitting in mixed-member electoral systems”, Electoral Studies 28: 1, 
2009, p. 51. 
24  PAVEL MAŠKARINEC 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 1  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
neither one of them is abandoned by voters, or when both are truly minor 
candidates and neither of them receives many votes. Third, SF-ratios themselves 
cannot identify who the key actors are. Finally, SF-ratio does not consider 
deviations from a two-party competition in which multiple small parties 
combine to capture significant portions of the vote.83 For these reasons, we also 
used the so-called Third-First Loser ratio, “TF-ratio”, introduced by Singer. The 
TF-ratio is defined as the vote share secured by the parties finishing the fourth 
(in other words, as the third runner-up) or worse as a proportion of the votes 
secured by the first runner-up. The TF-ratio is useful as another indicator of 
strategic coordination failure by voters and elites because it shows whether the 
support for the third-place or worse candidates is greater than the margin 
between the first- and second-place candidates.84 
 
 
Strategic Voting In Hungarian Elections Of 2014 
 
Table 1 presents the percentage of the vote received by the top two parties in 
SMDs since 1990. The results confirmed a long-term move to bipolar 
competition, partly interrupted in the elections of 2010 due to a significant 
decline in support of the MSZP. While in the elections of 1990 the two 
strongest parties (the MDF and the SZDSZ) won only 45.66% of the votes, the 
combined vote share of the top two parties after the elections of 2006 (the 
FIDESZ-KDNP and the MSZP) reached 82.25% of the votes. However, the 
outcome of the parliamentary elections of 2010 demonstrated an at least 
tentative disruption of the bipolarisation of electoral politics in Hungary, as the 
results for the MSZP were disastrous; the same was true for the following 
elections of 2014.85 
The MSZP, who governed Hungary between 2002 and 2010, thus was 
not able to recover its former electorate, thus contributing to a renewal of 
bipolar character of the Hungarian party politics. However, as the support for 
the FIDESZ remained at the very high level in the elections of 2014 (44.11% of 
the votes in SMDs), support for the two strongest parties (or coalitions, 
respectively, as both the FIDESZ and the MSZP ran as coalitions) still exceeded 
70% of the votes, although with the FIDESZ’s dominant (ultradominant) 
                                                 
83
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position in SMD contests, where the FIDESZ, together with its coalition partner 
(KDNP), received almost all (96 out of 106) of the seats. 
 
Table 1. The vote for candidates in SMDs, 1990 – 2014 (whole country) 
 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 
1st party 23.93 31.27 21.40 39.43 40.26 53.43 44.11 
2nd party 21.73 18.62 29.82 40.50 41.99 21.28 26.85 
1st and 2nd party 45.66 49.89 51.22 79.93 82.25 74.71 70.96 
Others 54.34 50.11 48.78 20.07 17.75 25.29 29.04 
Source: National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/); Jakub Šedo, Volební systémy 
postkomunistických zemí (Electoral systems of Post-communist countries), Centrum pro 
studium demokracie a kultury, Brno, 2007. 
Note: 1st party: MDF (1990), MSZP (1994), FIDESZ (1998), MSZP (2002), FIDESZ-KDNP 
(2006, 2010, 2014); 2nd party: SZDSZ (1990, 1994), MSZP (1998), FIDESZ-MDF (2002), 
MSZP (2006, 2010), MSZP-EGYÜTT-DK-PM-MLP (2014). 
 
Table 2 then presents the percentage of the vote received in the 
elections of 2014 by the top two candidates. The results demonstrate that a trend 
to the disruption of the bipolarisation of Hungarian electoral politics is present 
even if we focus on the electoral support of the two strongest candidates in 
SMDs, regardless of their party’s affiliation. In the elections of 2014, there was 
no district where the combined vote share of the top two candidates exceeded 
90%. Similarly, the top two candidates obtained more than 80% of the vote in 
four districts only (i.e. 3.77%). In most cases, the support for the top two 
candidates was between 70–79.99% (77.36%), but at the same time there were 
almost one fifth of the districts (18.87%) where their gains fell below 70%, 
although nowhere did it fall below 60%. We can conclude that the outcome of 
the Hungarian elections of 2014 was in stark contrast to the assumptions related 
to Duverger’s law. 
 
Table 2. The vote for the top two candidates in SMDs, 2014 (N = 106) 
 Number of districts Percentage of districts 
90.00 – 100.00 0 0.00 
80.00 – 89.99 4 3.77 
70.00 – 79.99 82 77.36 
60.00 – 69.99 20 18.87 
Source: National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/), author’s own calculations. 
 
However, as the attention to the percentage of the vote obtained by the 
top two candidates may create a misleading picture of the size of the party 
system, in the next step we will focus on the measure which weighs parties 
according to their relative sizes, too. Comparison of the long-term trends in the 
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number of Hungarian parties competing and elected (Table 3) shows that while 
there was a clear trend of the shrinking number of competing parties in the 
SMDs, completely the same statement may not be applied to the effective 
number of parties elected. Here, the trend to bipolarization was, in some cases, 
partially disrupted (the elections of 1994 or 1998), and finally totally broken in 
the elections of 2010 and 2014, when the value of ENPP measuring at a 
constituency level decreased to 1.05, or 1.22 respectively. Thus, Hungarian 
party system at the level of SMDs clearly shows the reduction to almost real 
one-party system. 
 
Table 3. Effective number of parties, 1990 – 2010 (whole country) 
 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
ENEPSMD 7.36 5.99 5.73 3.05 2.89 2.77 
ENEPALL 7.05 5.74 5.18 2.94 2.80 2.82 
ENPPSMD 2.15 1.38 2.70 2.05 2.17 1.05 
ENPPALL 3.77 2.90 3.45 2.21 2.40 2.00 
Source: Michael Gallagher, Electoral systems web site: Values of indices, 
https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIn
dices.pdf (accessed September 8, 2016). 
Note: SMD – single member district level, ALL – national level. 
 
However, if we move to the level of district competition (i.e. electoral 
level), rather than representation, which is the primary level regarding the 
evaluation of the strategic voting (Table 4), we have to refuse the claim about 
the long-term concentration of the votes in the two main parties, which was 
typical of the whole period since the “founding elections” of 1990 until the last 
elections using supermixed system in 2010. In contrast, while the reductive 
trend reached its peak after the elections held in 2010, with 2.77 electoral 
parties in SMDs, the first use of a plurality rule in 2014 resulted in an increase 
in the value of ENEP to 3.22 (at the national level), or to 3.10 (the mean value 
of SMDs), respectively. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of effective number of parties in SMDs, 2014 (N = 106) 
ENEPmicro (min) ENEPmicro (max) ENEPmicro (mean) ENEPmacro ENPPcoalition ENPPparties 
2.40 3.69 3.10 3.22 1.22 1.48 
Source: National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/), author’s own calculations. 
Note: ENEPmicro (min) – minimum value of ENEP at constituency level, ENEPmicro (max) – maximum 
value of ENEP at constituency level, ENEPmicro (mean) – average value of ENEP in the aggregate of 
constituencies, ENEPmacro – value of ENEP at national level, ENPPcoalition – value of ENPP at 
constituency level, insofar as the FIDESZ-KDNP and the Unity coalitions are viewed as single contenders, 
ENPPparties – value of ENPP at constituency level, insofar as the individual members of the FIDESZ-KDNP 
and the Unity coalitions are viewed as single contenders. 
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Figure 2 then outlines the effective number of competing parties in the 
Hungarian SMDs in the elections of 2014, confirming the finding presented 
above. A large part of the districts concentrated approximately between the 
values of 2.9 and 3.2, with a mean value of 3.10 (the values of the ENEP ranged 
from 2.40 to 3.69). More importantly, there were no districts with the ENEP 
smaller than 2.0, only one district (0.94%) with the ENEP between 2.01 and 
2.50, and all the other districts (99.06%) had the ENEP greater than 2.5, thus 
violating the expectations of Duvergerʼs law. 
 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of effective number of parties in SMDs, 2014 (N = 106)86 
 
The high concentration of SMDs around the level of three effective 
candidates in the elections of 2014 thus reflected Cox’s non-Duvergerian 
equilibrium and can be interpreted in context of the development of the 
Hungarian party system after the elections of 2010 which proved that Hungarian 
politics has overcome its “long term ‘entrenched’ twofold division”.87 While 
thus the opposition FIDESZ won a two-thirds majority of seats in the 
parliament, the MSZP lost its status of a second main pole of the Hungarian 
party system after a series of corruption scandals and unpopular policy 
measures, and two new parties – the extreme right-wing Jobbik and the green-
liberal Politics Can Be Different (LMP) – reached the 5% threshold, thus 
obtaining seats in the parliament. 
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Neither an effort of left-wing parties (including the MSZP) which ran as 
an election alliance in the elections of 2014 resulted in a renewal of bipolar 
character of the Hungarian party competition. The FIDESZ has maintained its 
dominant (ultradominant) position, while the left-wing alliance has suffered 
another loss, with only a slight lead over the Jobbik; the small LMP has retained 
its parliamentary representation, too.88 There is one important factor worth 
mentioning with regard to possible restoration of bipolar character of the 
Hungarian party competition. As mentioned Győri,89 the outcomes of the 
election resulted in establishing Jobbik’s prominent presence in the Hungarian 
political space. While in the elections of 2010 the Jobbik’s strongholds were 
especially in North-Eastern Hungary,90 four years later the party performed well 
even in some former MSZP’ strongholds (in East Hungary) which are decisive 
for recovering the left as the second pole of the Hungarian party system and a 
governing alternative to the FIDESZ. However, the increasing support for the 
Jobbik was visible even in some districts of traditionally conservative North-
Western Hungary, so the difference in party’s territorial support has become 
much narrower, in contrast with the past elections. The capital city of Budapest 
was one important exception, as the party remains far weaker here than in the 
rest of the country.91 Furthermore, the data from the polls show that while in the 
elections of 2010 most of the Jobbik’s voters supported the FIDESZ in previous 
elections (37%), considerable support for radical right was found between the 
former MSZP voters, too (21%), or between the first-time voters (13%), 
respectively. Our results thus confirmed Petsinis’ claim that the Jobbik took 
advantage of MSZP’s delegitimization. In the vacuum (or the absence) of the 
party with the status of a second (leftist) main pole of the Hungarian party 
system, it made a significant inroad into the leftist electorate (extent of this 
inroad is, however, the subject for future research) with its platform (or 
concept), the so-called “Eco-social National Economics”. The platform strongly 
criticised global capitalism and included such issues as endorsing state-
interventionism, higher taxation of multinational corporations, nationalization 
                                                 
88
  Századvég Foundation’s calculations showed that the influence of introduction of the new 
electoral system on election outcomes was not too strong, although the FIDESZ-KDNP 
coalition would be lost its two-thirds majority under the former supermixed system (SZ, 
Revitalized political system in Hungary, Századvég Foundation, Budapest, 2015, 
http://szazadveg.hu/ld/v0k5t1m3g9n3x2s4p1w0_SzazadvegFoundation_HungarianElectio
n2014.pdf (accessed 8 September 2016). 
89
  Gábor Győri, Hungarian Politics… cit., pp. 10-11. 
90
  András Bíró Nagy and Dániel Róna, “Rational Radicalism: Jobbik’s Road to the 
Hungarian Parliament”, in in Oľga Gyárfášová and Zora Bútorová (eds.), Alternative 
Politics?...cit., , p. 168. 
91
  Gábor Győri, Hungarian Politics… cit., pp. 10-11. 
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of vital sectors of the economy, or the state-ownership of sectors such as health 
and education.92 
 
 
Figure 3. Segmented Nagayama diagram for SMDs, 2014 (N = 106)93 
 
The values of ENEP as well as the results from a segmented Nagayama 
diagram (Figure 3) for the Hungarian SMDs in the elections of 2014 have 
confirmed that the character of the Hungarian electoral competition was far 
from the Duvergerian logic. The results show that most of the districts, more 
than two-thirds, lie in segment G (69.81%), indicating competition between 
more than two parties (i.e. the competitive multi-party segment of the diagram), 
although most of the districts in this segment approached segment H, which 
already defines strong competitive two-party dominance. In contrast, we found 
only a very limited number of districts in the segments with no substantial third-
party strength (A, B, H). None of them was found in the segment which is 
characteristic by very limited minor party strength and political competition 
between the top two parties (segment A), with the winner taking 50% or more 
of the total vote in the district. Similarly, only one district was found in segment 
B, characterised by a similar type of competition as segment A, with one 
important exception, namely non-competitiveness. Finally, merely three of the 
districts (2.83%) showed strong competitive two-party dominance (segment H), 
yet in contrast to the previous two cases, none of the top two parties was able to 
gain more than 50% of the vote in these districts. 
Thus, with the exception of segment G, the second largest number of 
districts was found in segments D and E, characterised by neither strong or 
complete single- or two-party dominance nor political competitiveness. Out of 
them, 7.55% of the districts were in segment E where the largest contender 
                                                 
92
  Vassilis Petsinis, “The ‘New’ Far Right in Hungary: A Political Psychologist's 
Perspective”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23: 2, 2015, p. 281. 
93  National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/), author’s own calculations. 
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obtained less than 50% of the vote, or 18.87% of the districts in segment D 
where the largest contender obtained more than 50% of the vote, respectively. 
To summarize the above-mentioned findings according to the three 
categories proposed by Grofman et al. (Table 5), the results show that only 
0.94% of the districts did not have any substantial third-party strength, 
representing two-party competition (segments A, B, C). Furthermore, if we 
complement the first category with segment H, which also represents 
(competitive) dominance of the top two parties, the proportion of the districts 
with limited minor party strength increases to a very limited extent to only 
3.57%. In contrast, more than fifth of the districts (26.42%) witnessed neither 
strong or complete single- or two-party dominance nor political competitiveness 
(segments D and E), and finally most of the districts (69.81%) witnessed multi-
party competition. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of SMDs by Nagayama segments, 2014 (N = 106) 
Segments Number of districts 
Percentage of 
districts 
A 0 0.00 
B 1 0.94 
C 0 0.00 
D 20 18.87 
E 8 7.55 
F 0 0.00 
G 74 69.81 
H 3 2.83 
Total 106 100.00 
Categories of districts  
Categories with no substantial third-party 
strength (A + B + C) 1 0.94 
Competitive districts (F + G + H) 77 72.64 
Neither strong or complete single- or two-party 
dominance nor political competitiveness (D + E) 28 26.42 
Total 106 100.00 
Source: National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/), author’s own calculations. 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that the character of electoral competition in 
Hungary is less than uniform, as the election outcomes in SMDs were 
characterized by a prevalent mix of competitive multi-party configurations, 
although the prevailing competitive character of elections remained 
contaminated by neither strong or complete single- or two-party dominance nor 
political competitiveness configurations in almost a fifth of the districts. 
Strategic Voting in the Hungarian Elections of 2014 31 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 1  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, the analysis using the Nagayama diagram shows that disruption of the 
bipolarisation of electoral politics in Hungary, compared with the elections of 
2006 or 2002, may be a longer lasting phenomenon, as the societal pressures are 
translated into a growth in the number of relevant political parties, which 
neither a plurality rule will be able to interrupt, at least in the near future. In this 
context, Nagy and Róna argue that the Jobbik’s success and future prospects 
may be long-term, as the party has a charismatic leader and it was able to build 
a solid organizational base and obtain subcultral embeddedness (especially 
among the youth) with a possible increasing party identification just among the 
youngest generations.94 
As with the previous indicators, even the values of SF-ratios and TF-
ratios confirmed an at least tentative disruption of the bipolarisation of electoral 
politics in Hungary. As a result, only two districts (1.89%) showed competition 
indicating a Duvergerian equilibrium (SF-ratio), while in nearly half (48) of the 
SMDs (45.28%) the SF-ratio values were above the upper limit. Similarly, the 
election results indicated voters’ limited willingness and limited ability to vote 
strategically by abandoning hopeless candidates in favour of those with a 
chance to succeed. Thus, we have found higher levels of strategic failure, with 
many voters casting their ballot for candidates that came out the third, fourth or 
below; only in a quarter (27) of the districts (25.47%), the values of the TF-ratio 
fell within the limit. 
The above mentioned findings are well illustrated when looking at a 
histogram of SF-ratios and TF-ratios (Figure 4) in Hungarian SMDs after the 
elections of 2014. Especially a very large number of the districts with the high 
SF-ratio values, crossing the upper limit and mostly concentrated around the 
level of 0.85 indicates Duvergerian non-equilibrium, i.e. many votes going to 
the candidates ranking the third in relation to second-place candidates. Similarly, 
the resulting TF-ratio patterns were not in full conformity with a Duvergerian logic, 
although the proportion of districts with competition indicating a non-
Duvergerian equilibrium, as well as TF-ratio values, was considerably lower 
than in case of SF-ratio, with most districts concentrated around the level of 
0.25–0.35, nearing the level, which indicates Duvergerian equilibrium. 
Overall, we have concluded that strategic voting is possible (i.e. that 
political elites and voters react strategically to the incentives of electoral law), 
yet this occurs only when certain crucial conditions are met. However, such 
conditions have not been met in contemporary Hungary. Even our analysis of 
strategic, or tactical, voting confirmed the findings that the effect of electoral 
institutions could be contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-
specific conditions. In Hungarian case, we can mention the current form of the 
party competition, which serves as the factor that limited voters’ rationality, 
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created problems with strategic decisions and ultimately made it very difficult 
for voters to abandon hopeless candidates; specifically, the Jobbik’s definitive 
rooting as one of the three main poles of the party system. 
This is possible to demonstrate by district-level outcomes. The Jobbik 
was not only able to increase its support in the former MSZP strongholds, and 
to a lesser extent also in the FIDESZ strongholds (as mentioned above), but 
more importantly, the Jobbik’s candidates finished second ahead of the 
FIDESZ, or the left-wing alliance candidates in 41 districts (38.7%), compared 
to 55 districts (51.89%) where the leftist candidates finished in second place; in 
the remaining 10 districts (9.43%) the FIDESZ’s candidates finished second 
behind the winning leftist candidates. Furthermore, while the ENPP (measuring 
at constituency level) reached the value of 1.22 in 2014, thus indicating the 
reduction to almost real one-party system at this level (in the sum of all SMDs), 
the opposite is true for the values of ENEP which increases to 3.10 (the mean 
value of all SMDs), clearly indicating disruption of bipolarization of the 
Hungarian political competition. The very similar findings were also confirmed 
by the Nagayma diagram which graphed the character of party competition. 
Even here, we have confirmed that most of the districts (more than two-thirds) 
witnessed multi-party competition, supplemented with more than a fifth of the 
districts with neither strong or complete single- or two-party dominance nor 
political competitiveness, and only in less than 1% of the SMDs we found two-
party competition with no substantial third-party strength. Similarly, the values 
of SF-ratio indicated voters’ limited willingness to vote strategically by 
abandoning hopeless candidates in favour of those with a chance to succeed. 
 
  
Figure 4. Histograms of SF-ratios and TF-ratios is SMDs, 2014 (N = 106)95 
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 National Election Office (http://valasztas.hu/), author’s own calculations. 
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Summary and conclusions 
 
The article has aimed to analyse strategic voting in the context of the adoption 
of the new Hungarian electoral law (mixed-member proportional, or 
compensatory mixed electoral system), which was first used in the elections of 
2014, and its influence on the character of Hungarian party competition. We 
have used some alternative methods to study the assumptions related to 
Duverger’s law, and have come to several conclusions. First, while the previous 
analysis showed that the strategic voting had a tendency to grow under 
Hungarian supermixed system in the period of 1990–2010,96 our analysis has 
shown that strategic voting is not a universal phenomenon in the elections of 
2014 under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger’s law 
in Hungarian SMDs. 
In our opinion, the main reasons behind the problems with tactical 
voting are rooted in transformation of the Hungarian party system after the 
elections of 2006. In these elections, the FIDESZ gained dominant 
(ultradominant) position, and weakness of the MSZP resulted in the rise of the 
Jobbik which became one of three main poles of the party system, with support 
only slightly ahead of the MSZP. Thus, while the FIDESZ clearly dominates 
almost all the districts, at the same time, it is not clear who the top challenger in 
particular SMD will be, and voters continue to support candidates of both the 
MSZP as well as the Jobbik. As a result, the differences between the second-
ranking candidate and the third-ranking candidate are very small, voters are 
unable to coordinate themselves, and the values of SF-ratio will tend to be 
higher, showing a non-Duvergerian equilibrium. 
More importantly, a deep ideological (de facto unbridgeable) distance 
between the MSZP and the Jobbik, or their voters, respectively, further hampers 
the possibility that voters of these parties would desert their preferred (possibly 
third-ranking) party (candidate), if they have only limited chances to gain a seat, 
to support a candidate from another camp who is expected to finish second. In 
contrast, the histogram of the TF-ratios shows that although the resulting TF-
ratio patterns were not in full conformity with a Duvergerian logic, most 
districts concentrated around the level, indicating the proximity to Duvergerian 
equilibrium. Thus, voters followed the logic of strategic voting and the third-
ranking candidates obtained many more votes than the fourth-ranking (or 
worse) candidates in the district. 
In this sense, our findings make it clear that plurality rule significantly 
reduces fragmentation of the party system (which is inhibited by the electoral 
system’s mechanical effects), even if the election results are not always in full 
compliance with Duverger’s law, as some indicators of strategic behaviour at 
the SMD level show that various SMDs can move far away from the 
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Duvergerian equilibrium. We have thus confirmed the original way of how 
Duverger conceived of his law, i.e. that electoral system (as an institution) plays 
an important role, but only in modifying the effect of social forces on the 
creation of political parties. The plurality rule (as an institutional structure) in 
SMDs thus acted as a “brake” on the process by which societal pressures 
translate into an excessive growth in the number of political parties, but on the 
other hand, it could not entirely suppress the underlying processes by which 
sociological factors shaped Hungarian party systems after the elections of 2010. 
Future research then should provide a more comprehensive answer on 
whether (or to what extent) the Hungarian electoral reform from December 
2011 has changed the strategic behaviour of Hungarian voters, as some authors 
claim that the expectations of Duverger’s law, as an equilibrium where only two 
candidates receive all the votes and the votes obtained by the third and following 
candidates approximate zero, are reached only over a series of elections.97 
However, the relatively stable and firmly rooting support of the 
FIDESZ, the MSZP and the Jobbik in certain social segments of the Hungarian 
society, together with the fact that a new Hungarian compensatory mixed 
electoral system distributes seats not only by plurality rule in SMDs (nominal 
tier), but also via proportional representation (list tier),98 can result in the fact 
that it will be very difficult (particularly in the near future) to achieve a political 
situation (corresponding to the expectations of Duverger’s law) when voters 
will be able to vote strategically, abandon the weaker candidate, thus pressuring 
toward a two-party competition over a series of elections. Further research thus 
should pay attention to cross-contamination of both tiers of Hungarian electoral 
system, as the list tier allows representation of smaller parties (apart from the 
two largest parties in SMDs) and supporters of these smaller parties thus are 
encouraged to support their third or worse-placed candidates also in SMD 
contests, together with possible influence of unfreezing social cleavages and the 
potential impact of the economic crisis on the transformation of the Hungarian 
party system. 
Particularly an analysis of ticket splitting, i.e. possibility that voters can 
cast two votes, each with different logic and impact on representation of 
political parties, can provide an interesting opportunity to study underlying 
effects of the new Hungarian electoral system, which may inhibit incentives for 
voters and candidates to act strategically. In this context, survey data will help 
to reveal more complex patterns in analysing strategic voting and ticket splitting 
under mixed-member proportional system and cross-contamination resulted 
from a vote linkage mechanism, which connects both tiers of electoral system.
                                                 
97
  Brian J. Gaines, “Duverger’s Law… cit.”. 
98
  The existence of the list tier can foster the willingness of small and medium-sized parties 
to nominate candidates even in the districts without a real chance to win a seat, in order to 
strengthen in front of the voters its image as a nationwide party. 
